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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 021501335 FS

ROBYN LYNN MILLER,

Appellant Case No. 20031009-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Argument Priority: (2)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I.
JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as
amended).
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There does not appear to be a significant distinction between the statement
of facts set forth in Appellant's brief and that of Appellee except for each party's way
of characterizing such facts. Appellant and Appellee have each put for the facts they
feel are most important and by examining both versions this Court will likely get the
fairest assessment of the circumstances and should be able to conclude that there
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is little or not dispute in terms of the evidence and testimony presented at trial.
III.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. 1
APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN
LIGHT OF STATE V. WINWARD. PROPERLY ON THE PURPOSE TO DEFEND
IS PLAIN ERROR AND NOT INVITED UNDER THE STANDARD.
As set forth in Appellee's brief and as it has been made clear in Appellant's
brief, the situation in the instant case resembles the circumstances set forth in State
v. Hamilton. 203 Utah 22, where no objection is made to jury instructions and as a
consequence the Supreme Court would not review the instruction under the manifest
injustice exception. However, the Appellant in this case asserts that she believes
there is a distinction in the circumstances between her case and that in Hamilton in
that it appears in latter the Supreme Court believed that the action taken was a
deliberate attempt to mislead the trial court. In the instant case, the evidence is
clear that the error which occurred was inadvertent and merely an oversight by both
court and defense counsel or alternatively a mistake in not understanding clearly this
Court's position in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995).
It is not difficult to understand how such a circumstance could have occurred
in light of the confusion which seems to be evident from State v. Winward. by
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comparing the interpretations of that case offered in the brief Appellant and in the
brief of Appellee. Clearly Appellant disagrees with Appellee's interpretation of what
that case stands for. Appellant reiterates the position that the Court of Appeals was
not condoning the concept of random or arbitrary fraudulent conduct. Even if the
facts and circumstances focus and direct the application of such general language
in the instruction.

On the basis of the point made by Appellee regarding a

concurrence of an unlawful acts and culpable mental state, the Appellant argues that
such is the very reason for a more specific instruction. If it was conceivable from the
facts and circumstances of the present case that the bank was the victim and not Mr.
Miller, then the proper solution was to instruct the jury accordingly on specific terms
and not generally to allow that and other inferences to be raised by the jury and
justified under a general designation of anyone. To reiterate what this Court stated
in State v. Windward, where the victim is easily identifiable, it is error to not
"sufficiently instruct the jury on the concept of specific intent as applied to the facts
of this case." Id at 914.
Appellee attempts to argue that there is no way the jury could have made a
mistake since it is just as much fraud if the fraudulent conduct is directed toward the
bank as it be if directed toward Mr. Miller. However, by not including a specific
person in which the intent to defraud was directed, the jury was left to speculate on

Page 3 of

8

others that could have been considered by way of their involvement. The most
obvious example would be whether or not the Appellant under the circumstances
defrauded her daughters or the post office by the actions set forth in the facts.
Appellant believes that the instruction was misleading and that it is plain error and
not subject to the invited error doctrine set forth in Hamilton.
POINT NO. 2
IT WAS ERROR BY THE COURT OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL NOT TO PROPOSE A CLAIM OF RIGHT DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
AT LEAST FOR THE CHARGE OF THEFT.
Although Appellee's brief does not make an outright concession, there is by
the manner of response to Appellant's claim of right defense instruction an
acknowledgment that the Appellant was entitled to the instruction at least with regard
to theft and Appellant contends that the proper instruction combined with a more
specific instruction on the forgery charge would have most likely resulted in a more
favorable verdict to the Appellant. Appellant was prejudiced by the inadvertence on
the one hand and the failure to acknowledge her personal right and interest in the
property she was convicted of having possessed with authorization at trial. It is a
paradox in that the trial court either erred in failing to give such instruction or the trial
attorney failed to provide effective assistance. It is difficult to review even from a
tactical basis why such an instruction was not requested.
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Oversight and

inadvertence do not seem to fit even a minimal standard of effective assistance in
implementing a flawed but reasonable trial strategy. Appellant disagrees with
Appellee's assessment that not seeking a "claim of right" jury instruction could be
considered sound trial strategy where the Appellant's exposure to felony charges
exceeded her exposure to the theft charge. Requesting the additional instruction
would in no way diminish the significance or increase the exposure to the felony
charges and would have more likely benefitted the Appellant's position by having the
instruction included rather than having no instruction on entitlement. On a less
obvious note, there is also to consider the defense counsel's failure to object to the
testimony of bank official's reimbursing the victim's monies withdrawn from the
victim's account. The Appellant believes that this is one of the reasons why in
Windward this Court was concerned about such a general instruction allowing the
jury to consider purpose to defraud anyone. In that regard, this Court stated:
The trial court's error in admitting evidence concerning transactions in
which others might have been taken advantage of was compounded by
the court's refusal to instruct the jurors that, in order to convict the
Defendant of forgery given the evidence before then, they must
conclude that the Defendant signed the victim's name to the check, the
Defendant possessed the specific intent to defraud the victim. State v.
Windward, 909 P.2d 913, 914.
The Appellant reiterates that since the relief sought is that of requesting a new
trial as opposed to reversal, there is less of a need to speculate on the outcome of
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the proceedings, as a new trial with proper instruction would eliminate the need to
guess about such a result.
POINT NO. 3

THE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN
MARSHALED.
The Appellant disagrees with Appellee as it regards whether the claims have
been preserved and the evidence has been marshaled to consider. The Appellant
has set forth the facts that support the jury's verdict and in fact informed this Court
that the likely explanation for such a result is that the jury chose to believe the victim
over the Appellant and their children. The Appellant contends that there is no
dispute in the facts submitted by the Appellant or the Appellee. The Appellant
contends that she has argued exceptional circumstances or plain error in the manner
in which it has been presented whether or not those terms of art have been utilized
in arguing the same. The Appellant believes that from the information presented this
Court should remand for new trial with proper instruction.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests a
new trial with such further and direction as this Court deem appropriate together with
such other and further relief as appears equitable and proper.
DATED this j £ ^ d a y of

^ ? f e s / ,

2 0 ^ - ^

J. BRYANOACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Miller
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